a party to a contract can sue on it and that consideration must move from the promisee, when applied, worked injustice in many situations and further, that it was commercially necessary to create an exception to the rules to allow a non-party beneficiary to sue on the policy. Moreover, he considered that the common law should develop in a parallel fashion with statutory reforms enabling recovery by non-party beneficiaries.
On appeal to the High Court it was argued by Trident that the two common law rules were fundamental principles of the law of contract and so embedded in our law that they should not be overturned by judicial decision even though their application to non-party beneficiaries' entitlement to recover was unsatisfactory. It was submitted that a trust of a contractual promise was the appropriate mechanism to protect the rights of non-party beneficiaries. (Trident had in the Court of .Appeal sought leave to plead the existence of a trust, not raised at first instance, between Blue Circle and McNiece, however leave was refused on evidentiary grounds).
Mason C.J. Their Honours alluded to judicial criticism and legislative erosion in other jurisdictions of the application of the rules in the field of insurance contracts. Notwithstanding their vintage they strongly favoured a departure from the established rules where injustice flowed as a result of their application. Their Honours stated:
Regardless of the layers of sediment which may have accumulated, we consider that it is the responsibility of this Court to reconsider in appropriate cases common law rules which operate unsatisfactorily and unjustly.
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Their Honours were of the opinion that if the old rules were applied in the field of insurance contracts, injustice would result from a failure to give effect to the expressed intentions of the contracting parties when a third party, aware of the existence of the policy, assumed that such an insurance was an effective indemnity in his favour, and on that footing ordered his affairs accordingly by refraining from making his own arrangements on insurance. For this reason a named beneficiary under a policy of insurance should be able to enforce the policy. Their Honours held therefore that McNiece was entitled to the indemnity.
Furthermore, the rights of a third party, it was held, ought not be made to depend on the vagaries and uncertainties of the alternative remedies of trust and estoppel because by ensuring that a third party can enforce an insurance contract the law is merely giving effect to what is the expressed intentions of the contracting parties.
Toohey J. also was of the opinion that the law be changed to allow recovery by McNiece. His Honour cited with approval the remarks made by Lord Reid in Myers v. Director of Public Prosecutions 7 in 1965 where His Lordship stated that if the Court were to extend the law it must do so by the development and application of fundamental principles and not introduce arbitrary change so as to enroach on what is the proper field of the legislature. His Honour posed the question whether in this case to uphold the decision of the Court of Appeal would be to intrude on that field. His concern was whether the law was so well entrenched that nothing short of legislative interference could fairly budge it. His Honour concluded that the jus queasitum tertio rule was based on "shaky foundations" and was therefore capable of judicial alteration.
Gaudron J., the final member of the majority, found the solution in the doctrine of unjust enrichment, 9 which was not argued before the court. On the other hand, Dawson J., in allowing the appeal, considered that the role of the court must be limited, favouring considered development of the law to the alternative of sheer abrogation. His Honour cited with approval 10 the remarks made by Sir Owen Dixon in "Concerning Judicial Method" in Jesting Pilatewhere his Honour stated: It is one thing for a court to seek to extend the application of accepted principles to new cases or to reason from the more fundamental of settled legal principles to new conclusions or to decide that a category is not closed against unforeseen instances which in reason might be subsumed thereunder. It is an entirely different thing for a judge, who is discontented with a result held to flow from a long accepted legal principle, deliberately to abandon the principle in the name of justice or of social necessity or of social convenience.
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His honour was of the opinion that in the case before him the argument put forward by McNiece that the Court ought to abandon, at least in the case of insurance contracts, the doctrine of privity of contract, was an invitation "not so much to engage in judicial creativity [but] to engage in the destruction of accepted principle which is a very different thing".
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Dawson J. remarked that the Court "...is neither a legislative nor law reform agency. It would do more harm than good to attempt to reach a right result by wrong means".
14 The respondent's remedy, he remarked, lay elsewhere: Equity,... provide[s] a means of averting the hardship which might otherwise arise from the application of the common law doctrine whilst at the same time preserving the conceptual basis of the law of contract 15 and particularly in the case of an insurance policy for the benefit of third persons equitable principle may, without undue complication be employed to temper any harshness arising from the common law. 16 His Honour said that there was every reason in this case why the rules of equity should be given a generous application. A trust of a contractual promise would have been the proper remedy for the respondent. However, his Honour said that future development of this approach would have to await other cases as in this case no trust was pleaded.
Dawson J. also addressed the point made by McHugh J.A. in the Court of Appeal, that the common law should develop in a parallel fashion with statutory reform. He was of the opinion that before the common law develops in a like manner with legislation there must be some "conceptual foundation" for changing the law. The court should not arbitrarily abandon established doctrine in emulation of statutory reform. 
